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Two main results in traditional tax theory states the following. First, general taxes minimize the welfare loss from 
changed relative prices. Second, because the total public budget tends to exceed the optimal size, a leader (here 
named ‘troop leader’) is needed in the budget process to prevent over-taxation. Nevertheless, differentiated taxes 
initiated by individual ministries generate a still larger proportion of total tax revenue, in particular under cover of 
taxing externalities such as environmental pollution. We suggest that this situation leads to over-taxation for two 
reasons. First, the absence of a strong and fully informed troop leader prevents rational coordination of collective 
action. Second, budget maximization leads to overwhelming fiscal pressure because bureaucracies are competing 
about resources just like fishermen or hunters (here named ‘bureaucratic tax-seeking’). Taxing citizens or firms is 
like harvesting rents from a natural resource and therefore we apply a common-pool resource model. Because 
bureaucracies compete about maximizing their share of tax payers‘ money, this leads to over-taxation and an 
irrational outcome for both bureaucrats and society. These suggestions are strongly confirmed by the case of the 
Danish waste tax. Thus, we recommend that bureaucratic institutions should coordinate their tax-seeking efforts 
to maximize budgets in the long run and that the ministries that collect green tax revenues should not be allowed 
to control these revenues. Such a budget maximization opportunity would kick off a new self-destructive fiscal 
race among competing tax-seeking bureaucracies. 
 
JEL-codes: H0-H4, Q0. 
 
Key words: bureaucratic tax-seeking, troop leader, common-pool resource model, green taxation, 
waste tax. 
 
                                                 




Traditional tax theory states for an economy with exclusively pure private market goods and pure 
public goods that except for a few cases of very limited scope, taxes used in practice violate the 
Pareto optimum conditions in an economy without externalities and hence impede an efficient 
allocation of resources.
2 Taxation is then in practice - at best - a question of second best solutions. 
Modern economies contain a variety of mixed goods characterized by negative externalities in the 
production or in the consumption. Green taxation can ideally neutralize the loss of welfare from such 
negative externalities. As suggested by Pigou (1920), politicians should control pollution by imposing 
a uniform tax on the externality following harmful emissions. At the same time green taxation makes 
the lowering of other distortive taxes possible.  In this way, green taxation may provide a double 
dividend by establishing the collective good of environmental improvement (at least cost) and by 
lowering other distortive taxes (see Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001). 
 
This ongoing restructuring of the tax revenues can therefore eventually contribute to increasing the 
social efficiency in modern economies recognizing still stronger negative externalities and mobilizing 
still stronger political capacity to optimizing social efficiency. Green taxes seem in principle to be 
good taxes. The insight from empirical welfare economics, that green taxation does not generally 
counterbalance negative externalities in the economy, brings us to introduce disciplines from public 
choice in search of how to explain the lack of social efficiency.  
 
In spite of the fact, that green taxes are used more and more extensively in Western Europe, policy 
makers do not follow the advice of environmental economists when designing green taxation. For 
example, a review of green tax schemes applied in OECD countries clearly shows that economic 
efficiency has not been the driving force behind the politics of green taxation (ibid.). In general, the 
level of green taxation in Europe is set too low to have the desired effect on environmental behavior. 
Thus, Howe (1994) and Daugbjerg and Svendsen, 2001) concludes that the effect of green taxation is 
fiscal rather than environmental.  
                                                 
2Bohm (1987).  
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The fiscal effect from green taxation is shown in Figure 1 below. Here, the graph shows total 
revenues from green taxation in per cent of total tax revenues in 26 OECD Member countries (for 






Figure 1: Revenues from environmentally related taxes in per cent of total tax revenues, 1994-97. 
Source: OECD (2000). 
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Why does this fiscal pressure from green taxation occur? We will try to answer this question in two 
steps. First, in Section 2, we undertake a general theoretical analysis building on a ’troop leader 
model‘ (based on Von Hagen and Harden, 1995) and a ’common-pool resource model‘ (based on 
Tietenberg, 2000). Second, in Section 3, we turn to empirical evidence, namely the specific case of 
the Danish waste tax. Normally, it is not possible to trace actual bureaucratic behavior as it takes 
place in the dark and authors, so far, have not proven that actual bureaucratic rent-seeking has 
influenced political decision-making (see Tullock, 1967; Mueller, 1989 and Niskanen, 1994).  
 
What furthermore characterizes an environmental bureaucracy is that they do not need organization 
to promote their interests. Due to their function, environmental bureaucrats will be involved in 
designing both national and international policies, and hence can promote their interests at all levels. 
This also means that it is hard to determine the influence of environmental bureaucracy as it does not 
rent-seek openly (Boom and Svendsen 2000, JITE). 
 
Overall, we argue that strong fiscal pressure is strengthened by bureaucratic rent-seeking. Thus, we 
name this behavior ’bureaucratic tax-seeking‘ in the context of our troop leader and common-pool 
resource models. Environmental economists have in general paid no, or at best very little, attention to 
this bureaucratic context within which green taxation is to be introduced. So, to understand the real-
life politics of green taxation and to base future policy recommendations on this analysis, one must 
identify the bureaucratic interests which determine the actual design of green taxes. In other words, 
our contribution is to fill the gap between theory and reality by revealing the bureaucratic constraints 
which determine the actual design of green tax schemes and to suggest a policy recommendation that 








2: Bureaucratic Tax-Seeking 
 
As we saw in Figure 1, green tax revenues constitutes, by now, a significant part of total tax revenues 
in OECD countries. This taxation is a result of the government budget process. The budget process 
describes how decisions concerning public resources are made: It is the answer to the question, who 
does what, when, and how in the preparation and the implementation of the budget. The budget 
process is governed by formal and informal rules of behavior and interaction.
3  
 
Our argument is that this budget process leads to over-taxation and an irrational outcome for both 
bureaucrats and society as a whole. In the following, we will explain why by developing two 
theoretical models, namely the ‘troop-leader model’ (Section 2.1) and the ‘common-pool resource 
model’ (Section 2.2). The single-minded focus on fiscal purposes may finally lead to green taxation 




2.1: The Troop Leader 
 
Von Hagen and Harden (1995) formulate a model in which the overall government interest to meet 
the policy targets of all activities and to keep the social excess burden of taxation small leads to a 
government utility function. As borrowing is not possible the government optimal budget and the 
taxation is derived from this utility function. 
 
                                                 
3Von Hagen and Harden (1995), p.772. 
As the government consists of a number of spending ministers the budget process is carried out by 
politicians characterized each of them by incentives different from obtaining the optimal budget seen 
from the collective government point of view. While spending minister has an interest to reach the 
policy target of his activity, each spending minister also receives a private utility gain from the size of  
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his allocation, reflecting the political support of his constituency in response to greater benefits and, 
possibly, the prestige from commanding over larger resources. Furthermore each spending minister 
takes into account only a share of the burden of taxation that falls on his constituency. As a 
consequence the resulting budget from a budget process with spending ministers being able to 
manifest individual interests will be larger than the government optimal budget. The budget exhibits a 
spending bias because of each spending ministers extra utility from spending and because that the 
spending ministers neglect the externality the budget constraint imposes on all others if the spending 
ministers allocation is increased. 
 
In von Hagens and Hardens model the spending bias can be reduced by strengthening the collective 
interest of the government. They introduce one or several ministers without portfolio - typically the 
minister of finance - not bound by the particular interests of a spending department and equipped with 
special strategic powers in the budget process as the power to set binding limits for the departmental 
allocations. Von Hagen and Harden show that the existence of the minister without portfolio partly 
overcomes the externality problem as such a minister presents a more integrating view of the budget. 
Raising the strategic power of the minister without portfolio reduces the impact the individual gains 
from spending has on the budget. 
 
In Denmark the Ministry of Finance has taken up a still stronger position as coordinator of the general 
economic policy.
4 This implies that this ministry has conquered a still stronger ability to ensure a 
result from the budget process close to the collective optimum. The ability to hold such a position as 
coordinator in the budget process depends on the traditional economic policy logic of taxation. Two 
basic assumptions in the von Hagen Harder model are that taxes are caused by the need of public 
revenue and that taxes are reducing social welfare. However, the economic policy logic of real-world 
green taxation differs from this ideal world of having one troop leader making the right overall budget 
decisions due to bureaucratic tax seeking for two reasons.  
 
                                                 
4 Christensen (2000), p- 88-89.  
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First, asymmetric information plays a crucial role. The problem is that the troop leader does not have 
sufficient information to control individual ministries and their activities concerning environmental tax 
revenues and their use. Such a task is most complex and asymmetric information therefore allows 
individual ministries to pursue private interests and budget-maximize. 
 
Second, externalities may be promoted as new ideologies. Anne O. Krueger (1997) derives some 
universal learning about dangers in converting economic theory into legitimacy of economic policy 
from her years in the World Bank. She finds that a main problem in this converting process is 
misapplication of Good Theory. If (in principle good) economic theory is non-operational of nature or 
if the stylized facts are ignored, it opens for the establishing of a policy consensus taking form of an 
ideology conflicting with social efficiency. 
 
Developing green taxation into being an ideology furthermore allows the spending ministry to keep 
the revenue for its own budget. This leaves the spending ministry free to use these revenues for 
employing more people. By creating more jobs for itself, it maximizes budgets and strategically 
consolidates its position by reducing the risk of not surviving potential future budget cuts. Already 
Dich (1973) has in a Danish context shown that welfare economics and externalities constitute such 
Good Theory which on the other hand is non-operational by nature. Thereby it allows the 
bureaucracy to construct an ideology dictating public growth. Once such ideology has been 
established, stylized facts are ignored. During a longer period since Dich the public growth has been 
strong.  The overall tax level has reached a very high level and the capacity of taxation in the 




2.2: Common-Pool Resource 
 
If an environmental bureaucracy is left more or less on its own, it is free to strive for the maximization 
of its budgets. An economically rational bureaucracy will maximize budgets because it can grow  
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stronger by creating more jobs and resources for itself. This pursuing of bureaucratic goals rather than 
those of the general public is possible due to its monopoly power (Mueller, 1989). This is the reason 
why government budgets have become too large and should be reduced, Niskanen (1994). 
 
Now, the general idea is that bureaucratic tax-seeking affects the design of green taxation in favor of 
bureaucracy and drives it too far compared to the optimal point. More specifically, we suggest that 
strong fiscal pressure occurs because bureaucracies are competing about resources just like fishermen 
or hunters. Taxing is like fishing or hunting.  
 
Bureaucracies compete about maximizing their share of  tax payers‘ money. This leads to an irrational 
outcome. Why? Because competition means ’over-taxing.’ Taxing citizens and industry is a free-
access resource (or ’common-pool resource’). It is not a pure public good because it only fulfills the 
first condition of non-exclusivity (where everyone can exploit the resource). The second condition of 
non-divisibility (where consumption does not change the good) is not fulfilled.
1 Because the capture 
must be subtracted from the amount available to other bureaucracies, taxing is not a true public good 
but a semi-public good, i.e. a private good with open access. Therefore, the first-come, first-served 
principle applies; no individual or group hold power (or it does not pay) to restrict access. 
Consequently, we argue, overtaxing occurs, also leading to some green taxation against industry but 
without significant environmental effects in total. 
 









                                                 
1 Other well-known examples of such ￿open-access-ressources￿, the socalled ￿tragedy of the commons￿ (Hardin, 
1968), are the rainforest, common grazelands and bison hunting.  
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Figure 2: Green taxation as a common-pool resource. 
 
 
Source: Based on Tietenberg (2000, 284) 
 
 
The total benefit curve (TB) shows the annual tax revenue following green taxation (waste taxation in 
this specific setting). Even though the environmental bureaucracy does not get the tax revenue 
directly (it is typically collected by the Ministry of Taxation using already existing administrative 
infrastructure for doing so), the money will typically be recycled to the environmental bureaucracy (as 
happened e.g. in the Danish case) for environmental investments, earmarking, monitoring, 
enforcement, approval procedures etc. So, eventually, the tax revenue returns as more jobs and higher 










Total costs (TC) shows the bureaucratic costs of taxing. The TC curve in this setting is different from 
the case of a fisherman spending equipment and time to get his catch. Bureaucracies which invest in 
increased tax collections benefit themselves from it as they hire more people to do so. Therefore, the 
TC curve described here assumes that the budget is fixed so that resources spent for inventing and 
implementing further tax collections must be found somewhere else within that same bureaucracy. 
Also, the TC curve may include political costs in the sense that too aggressive behavior may lead to 
political awareness and future budget cuts. This political risk following tax-seeking may be taken into 
account too. 
 
Net benefits from green taxation are derived as the difference (vertical distance) between TB and TC. 
This vertical distance between TB and TC is maximized at taxation effort Ee. This is the efficient level 
where marginal benefits (MB) is equal to marginal costs (MC). MB is represented as the slope of the 
TB curve and the MC tangent represents the slope of the TC curve. 
 
Because access to taxation is basically unrestricted (non-exclusive), an increasing number of 
bureaucracies will expand taxing effort beyond Ee.  Why does overtaxing occur? It occurs because 
each bureaucracy has an incentive to increase taxing efforts until profits are zero, that is to Ec in 
Figure 2. At this point, total revenue from green taxation is reduced and total costs increased 
compared to the optimal level, Ee. 
  
Just like the individual fisherman trying to catch as much fish as possible, each bureaucracy will try to 
’harvest‘as many tax revenues as possible per year. Even though extra green taxation reduces the 
population of production factors (e.g. industries may shut down or move abroad), the individual 
bureaucracy gets all the benefits and bears only a small share of the costs. By this, overtaxing will 
occur. Reversibly, it does not pay the single bureaucracy to reduce taxes. If one bureaucracy reduces 
taxation on its own, the benefits are mainly captured by others that do not restrain their behavior. Just 
like the individual fisherman that creates a larger catch for all the other fishermen by fishing less.  
 
In perspective, bureaucratic tax-seeking will or affect the design of green taxation in favor of fiscal 
purposes. This drives the total level of taxation too far. According to economic theory, the state will 
maximize its total tax revenue by reaching the top point on the Laffer curve, where the product of the 
tax rate and national income is maximized. However, our logic of bureaucratic tax-seeking leads  
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eventually to a situation where total tax level in society is situated to the right of the optimal tax rate.  
 
Note, that it is not the single employee in an environmental bureaucracy that drives green taxation too 
far. It is the professional staff of lobbyists which has been hired to represent the interests of that very 
institution. Because the issue is one of institutions and impersonal mechanisms, interests are viewed as 
being promoted in an anonymous way such as negotiations among politicians and representatives for 
bureaucracies. In this way, the incentive to maximize environmental budgets derives from impersonal 
negotiations at the institutional level, Svendsen (1998). 
 
In summary, bureaucracies will reap more than what is efficient to maintain the efficient amount of 
production factors. These uncoordinated activities reduce the stock of production thereby lowering 
future economic growth rates. Therefore, it is important that bureaucracies coordinate their taxing 
efforts, e.g. by avoiding the use of green taxes in relation to well-organized industries. If not, 
bureaucracies as a whole will reduce their future tax revenues (following the drop in production), that 




2.3 The Problem of Equivalence 
 
The theorem of Ricardian Equivalence states, that deficit finance is no different from current taxation, 
since individuals fully take into account the future taxes they will have to pay (Blanchard and Fischer, 
1989, p. 129). The core point in this theorem is that public spending definitely has to be covered by 
public revenue when seen over a longer period, and that the individuals understand this simple logic. 
The original argument behind green taxation is the allocation effect, but when a fiscal function in 
reality becomes the dominant rationality of green taxation, a new type of equivalence problem can 
arise. 
 
Normally the revenue from green taxation will be specified in the public budget and the agents in the 
economy will realize, that this revenue is necessary for balancing the economy. This means that 
reactions from the responsible spending ministry are to be expected if changed behavior among the  
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agents in the economy results in a reduced revenue from the green taxes. Such reactions are especially 
to be expected if the revenue from a green tax is dedicated to financing activities in the spending 
ministry.  If the agents in the economy realize that the revenue from a green tax is fixed due to fiscal 
purposes, the agents cannot free themselves from the burden of the tax even when changing behavior 
and reducing the tax releasing behavior. Overall, we are left with a zero sum game where the likely 





3: The Danish Waste Tax 
 
A waste tax was introduced in a modest form in Denmark in 1987.
2 The tax was collected as a duty 
tax after weight imposed on all waste covered by a compulsory deliveries regulation. 
 
The Danish waste tax became soon raised substantially. The higher tax level was introduced in 1990 
with a revision of the 1987 law.
3 In the comments to the law proposal the responsible minister of the 
environment formulated an argumentation for raising the level of waste taxation.
4 The argumentation 
is (translation from Danish by the authors): ‘The background (for raising the tax level) is among other 
things an expected growth at around 50 pct. in the amounts of waste in the period until the beginning 
of the next millenium. Thus, a further strengthening of the effort to increase recirculation  is needed.’ 
 
When presenting the law proposal, the minister of the environment pointed out, that an ongoing  
improvement of the technique in Danish refuse disposal plants would possibly change the need of 
economic incentives within the next 2 to 3 years, and that the ministry then would present a  report 
analyzing this problem. When preparing the latter, the ministry of the environment initiated a research 
                                                 
2 Law concerning alteration of law on protection of the environment. Law number 329. June 4. 1986. 
 
3 Law on tax on waste and raw materials. Law number 838. June 6. 1989. 
4 Proposal for Law on tax on waste and raw materials. Proposal number LSF 100. December 7. 1989.  
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project on the effects of the waste tax. This research project resulted in Christoffersen, Hansen, 
Hansen and Kriegbaum (1992). They characterized the effects from the waste tax on the incentives in 
the waste production and treatment system. These effects within the three largest segments of waste 
production covering about 70 % of total ordinary waste production are summed up in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Effects from the waste tax on the incentives in the waste production and treatment 





All households are obliged to hold and to pay a fixed price for a garbage can. The 
local municipality is responsible for managing the waste collection and for paying 
waste tax. By charging a fixed price per year not weighting the production of waste 
in the individual household, the households are not allowed to free themselves from 
the burden of the tax. The municipalities are obliged to separate the economy in the 
waste collection task from the municipal economy as a whole, so reduction of 
household waste production does not improve the economy of the individual 
municipality.  
 




Reduction of waste production or increase of recirculation is complicated and costly 
to implement. The size of the waste tax is small compared with this. Experiences 
documented in empirical studies seem to show that changed performance in waste 
treatment in industrial companies can mainly be explained by a combination of 
offering consultancy services to the companies and using bureaucratic regulation. 
The waste tax seems to be of only a minor importance.   
 
Construction sector waste 
 
Important recirculation possibilities, but dependent upon the presence of plants for 
treatment and manufacturing of materials usable in new production processes.   
Experiences documented in empirical studies seem to show that changed 
performance in waste treatment in construction companies can also be explained by 
the municipal use of bureaucratic regulation, whereas the effects of the waste tax 
seem to rather small. 
Source: Based on Christoffersen, Hansen, Hansen and Kriegbaum (1992) 
 
 
When confronting the argumentation behind the waste tax with these effects, emphasis should be laid 
on two questions as seen in Table 3. The first question concerns the existence of a link between the 
size of the waste tax and the behavior of the waste producers. Such a link exist only if the waste 
producers  are able to free themselves from the tax by changing behavior. The second question 
concerns the existence of alternatives in persecuting the purpose of influencing the behavior of the 
waste producers. The waste tax is a convenient instrument only if there does not exist other  
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instruments characterized by obtaining the desirable effects at lowest costs. 
 




Is the waste producer allowed to 
free himself from the burden of 
the tax?  
 
Does there exist means 
characterized by stronger desired 





No. Not as long as the municipalities 
are charging a fixed price 
 
* Charging waste tax variably by 
weight 
* Regulating the waste potential in 
household consumption 
 
Industry waste. Not including 
environmentally problematic waste 
 
Yes, but complicated 
 
* Consultancy support to industries 
* Administrative regulation 
* Voluntary agreements with 
industries 
 
Construction sector waste 
 
Yes, if relevant public facilities are 
at disposal 
 
* Establishing recirculation facilities 
* Administrative regulation 
* Voluntary agreements with 
companies 
 
Source: Based on Christoffersen, Hansen, Hansen and Kriegbaum (1992) 
 
 
The conclusions which can be drawn from Table 3 seems to be that it is more than doubtful whether 
the waste tax represents an optimal choice of solution to the problem defined in the official   
argumentation behind the legislation. 
 
The legal lines of direction concerning the use of the revenue from the waste tax are defines in the 
official comments from the minister on the original law proposal from 1986  introducing the waste 
tax.
5 These comments states that ’On the approved budget for 1986 an account is established under 
the ministry of the environment concerning the revenue from taxes and fees within the waste sector. 
The revenue is presupposed used to financing the solution of waste problems and to encourage 
reduction of waste production and increasing recirculation and with that environmental improvements 
                                                 
5 Proposal for law changing law on environmental protection. Proposal number LSF 176. 1986.  
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in a broad sense‘ (translation from Danish by the authors). 
 
These premises for the use of the waste tax revenue constitute together with the argumentation for 
the waste tax the factors defining the political logic of the waste tax: The waste tax is not caused by 
the need in general of public revenue but by the need of adjusting the resource allocation in the 
economy. In doing so the waste tax is increasing social welfare.  
 
The design of the waste tax constitutes an incentive for the minister of the environment and for the 
bureaucracy in this ministry to ensure a large revenue from the tax. As the level of the tax is 
controlled by the parliament the ability of the ministry to influence the revenue consists mainly in 
letting the waste reducing effect of the tax be small and by avoiding the use of other means having a 
stronger effect. 
 
Because of this the ministry of the environment has a strong incentive to disseminate two ideas. First, 
the idea of a threat against society from the waste production. Second, the idea that the appropriate 
instrument to challenge this threat is green taxation. General approval of these ideas is needed to 
ensure the continuation of the tax and to ensure autonomy in relation to the ministry of finance as the 
overall budget coordinator (the ’troop leader’). These ideas refers to Good Theory and according to 
Anne Krueger they open for misapplication and the establishing of a policy consensus taking form of 
an ideology if they are non-operational of nature or if the stylized fact are ignored. 
 
When the ministry of the environment in 1992 received the research rapport which the ministry itself 
has initiated (Christoffersen, Hansen, Hansen and Kriegbaum (1992)), the ministry locked it up. The 
results therefore did not reach the Parliament before reading the proposal for raising the tax level 








Our starting point was the two main results in traditional tax theory. First, that general taxes 
minimized the welfare loss from changed relative prices. Second, because the total public budget 
tended to exceed the optimal size, a leader (here named ‘troop leader’)  was needed in the budget 
process to prevent over-taxation.  
 
Nevertheless, differentiated taxes initiated by individual ministries generate a still larger proportion of 
total tax revenue, in particular under cover of taxing externalities such as environmental pollution. We 
suggested that this situation led to over-taxation for two reasons. First, the absence of a strong and 
fully informed troop leader prevented rational coordination of collective action. Second, budget 
maximization led to overwhelming fiscal pressure because bureaucracies were competing about 
resources just like fishermen or hunters (here named ‘bureaucratic tax-seeking’). Taxing citizens or 
firms was arguably like harvesting rents from a natural resource and therefore we applied a common-
pool resource model. Because bureaucracies competed about maximizing their share of tax payers￿ 
money, this led to over-taxation and an irrational outcome for both bureaucrats and society. These 
theoretical propositions were strongly confirmed by the case of the Danish waste tax.  
 
Thus, we recommend that bureaucratic institutions should coordinate their tax-seeking efforts to 
maximize budgets in the long run and that the ministries that collect green tax revenues should not be 
allowed to control these revenues. Such a budget maximization opportunity would kick off a new 
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